The state has once again emerged as a central concern in the social sciences. It has also been rediscovered by practitioners of development and powerful international agencies such as the World Bank (1997), which now advocates ''good governance'' by lean and effective structures of government. However, in the vocabulary of World Bank economists the state and its institutions remain strangely ahistorical entities, a set of functional imperatives of regulation arising from society but devoid of distinct characters and different historical trajectories. In this influential train of thought the state is always the same, a universal function of governance. In the 1970s, theories of the capitalist state also privileged the state's functions in reproducing labor and conditions for accumulation of capital over its forms and historicity. Also, when Evans, Ruschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985) ''brought the state back in'' as an actor in its own right, their conceptualization of state revolved around certain assumed core functions and historical tasks that every state presumably had to perform.
The current rethinking of the state occurs at a juncture where the very notion of the state as a regulator of social life and a locus of territorial sovereignty and cultural legitimacy is facing unprecedented challenges. Ethnic mobilization, separatist movements, globalization of capital and trade, and intensified movement of people as migrants and refugees all tend to undermine the sovereignty of state power, especially in the postcolonial world. The equations among state, economy, society, and nation that constituted the dominant idea of stateness in the twentieth century have been undermined from below by growing demands for decentralization and autonomy, and from above by the imperatives of supranational coordination of monetary, environmental, and military policies in new configurations after the cold war.
At the same time, the discourse of rights and the proliferating demands for a variety of entitlements have expanded and transformed the meanings of citizenship. The paradox seems to be that while the authority of the state is constantly questioned and functionally undermined, there are growing pressures on states to confer full-fledged rights and entitlements on ever more citizens, to confer recognition and visibility on ever more institutions, movements, or organizations, and a growing demand on states from the so-called international community to address development problems effectively and to promote a ''human rights culture,'' as the latest buzzword goes. This paradox has to do with the persistence of the imagination of the state as an embodiment of sovereignty condensed in the covenant, as Hobbes saw it; as the representation of the volonté generale producing citizens as well as subjects; as a source of social order and stability; and as an agency capable of creating a definite and authorized nation-space materialized in boundaries, infrastructure, monuments, and authoritative institutions. This myth of the state seems to persist in the face of everyday experiences of the often profoundly violent and ineffective practices of government or outright collapse of states. It persists because the state, or institutionalized sovereign government, remains pivotal in our very imagination of what a society is. Whether we agree on what the state means or not, ''it'' is, nonetheless, central to all that is not state: civil society, ngos, the notion of a national economy, the market, and the sense of an international community.
This paradox of inadequacy and indispensability has robbed the state of its naturalness and has enabled scholars from many disciplines to study stateness as a historical and contingent construction. Following Philip Abrams's (1988) important unpacking of the state in theoretical terms and Corrigan and Sayer's (1985) work on the state in Britain, a growing body of work has begun to chart historical trajectories of state formation in various parts of the world. Much of this work has been inspired by Gramscian notions of class power articulated through always fragile and contested hegemonies, as Even in Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) influential poststructuralist rethinking of hegemony and politics beyond social determinism, the question of the state remained submerged in a wider category of ''the political,'' now liberated from the straitjacket of essentialist thinking but also far removed from empirical categories. In this perspective, the state, or just institutions, remain entirely political, that is, alterable and floating, and only appear as relatively stable ''nodal points'' in discursive formations (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 112 -13) or as relatively routinized forms of power that have become ''sedimented'' and stable as their political origins have been effaced (Laclau 1990: 34 -35) .
Foucault found issues of legitimacy and sovereignty less relevant. Instead he explored how modernity was marked by the emergence of a broader field of government of conduct-of the self, of the family, of institutions, of the body, and so on. Foucault famously remarked, ''We need to cut off the King's head: in political theory it still needs to be done' ' (1980: 121) . In Foucault's view, the intensified regulation of modern societies was not a result of the penetration of the state as a center of power, but the other way around: the modern state was an ensemble of institutional forms made possible because of the general ''governmentalization'' of societies, that is, the specific ways human practices became objects of knowledge, regulation, and discipline. In this view, the modern state is not the source of power but the effect of a wider range of dispersed forms of disciplinary power that allow ''the state'' to appear as a structure that stands apart from, and above, society (Mitchell 1999: 89) .
As has been remarked by many of Foucault's interpreters, one finds little interest in the state or in politics in Foucault's writings (see, e.g., Hindess 1996: 96 -158; Ransom 1997: 101-53). Although frequently invoked in studies of resistance, Foucault had very little to say about resistance as such beyond mere reactions to new strategies of power, a kind of ubiquitous inertia he at one point likened to chemical processes (1982: 209) . Instead, his interest was rather consistently in the conditions of possibilities of politics: how certain disciplinary forms, certain styles of knowledge and governmentalities made specific policies plausible, specific forms of rationality thinkable, and forms of political discourse possible and intelligible. Can these stances, harboring such different epistemological strategies, be reconciled? The answer is that they obviously cannot be reconciled completely, but also that they may not need to be. Our argument is that keeping these two perspectives in a productive tension with one another affords a somewhat broader perspective on the ambiguities of the state: as both illusory as well as a set of concrete institutions; as both distant and impersonal ideas as well as localized and personified institutions; as both violent and destructive as well as benevolent and productive. Modern forms of state are in a continuous process of construction, and this construction takes place through invocation of a bundle of widespread and globalized registers of governance and authority, or, as we prefer to call it, ''languages of stateness.'' The central proposition of this volume is that the study of the state and its practices must discern and explore these different languages, their localized meanings, genealogies, and trajectories as they appear couched in mythologies of power, as practical, often nonpolitical routines or as violent impositions. This requires that one study how the state tries to make itself real and tangible through symbols, texts, and iconography, but also that one move beyond the state's own prose, categories, and perspective and study how the state appears in everyday and localized forms: in brief, to study the state, or discourses of the state, from ''the field'' in the sense of localized ethnographic sites, whether ''inside'' or ''outside'' of the evanescent boundary between society and the state that usually crumbles when subjected to empirical scrutiny.
Languages of Stateness
In a recent article on the character of the modern state, Pierre Bourdieu outlines in his inimitable style the problem of studying the state as one of escaping the ''thought of the state'': ''To have a chance to really think a state which still thinks itself through those who attempt to think it, then, it is imperative to submit to radical questioning all the presuppositions inscribed in the reality to be thought and in the very thought of the analyst'' (1999: 55). Bourdieu remarks wryly that given the ease with which ''social problematics''-as they are diagnosed from the point of view of states claiming to represent society and the common good-are taken over by the social sciences and thus given the stamp of quasi-independent thinking, social scientists may in fact be singularly ill-equipped to meet this task.
Bourdieu expands Weber's classic formulation and characterizes the formation of the modern state as a process of concentration whereby ''it,'' the x that is the state, acquires a monopoly of physical and symbolic violence over a territory and its population. The state condenses four types of ''capital'':
violence, economic capital (tax and regulation), informational capital (curricula, validation of knowledge, etc.), and symbolic capital (juridical discourse, nomination, validation, etc.). Together they constitute, argues Bourdieu, capital étatique, state capital, the (meta)authority to validate or invalidate other forms of authority, that is, to have the last word in a territory, to have the last judgment (1999: 67). To maintain this supreme position as the summit of society, each institutional field that sees itself as a part of the state must devise elaborate institutional rites, schemes of classifications, hierarchies of competence, achievement and honor to retain order and a distance between itself and ''society'' as well as other parts of the state. Bourdieu's concern is not so much whether or how the state governs but rather how the specific authority of the state, its stateness and its hegemonic location at the center of society, is (re)produced through symbols and rituals.
Although Bourdieu's outline of the symbolic registers of the state does not acknowledge its own mirroring of French étatisme, it does rather usefully remind us that the disciplinary forms of power of the state constantly are engaged in a perpetuated reproduction of the state, its institutions, its hierarchies, its own languages and forms of identities produced and sanctioned by its procedures. The state not only strives to be a state for its citizen-subjects, it also strives to be a state for itself and is expected by populations, politicians, and bureaucrats to employ ''proper'' languages of stateness in its practices and symbolic gestures.
As we try to understand how states in contemporary Africa and Asia are imagined and designed we are inadvertently thrown back on the historical development of modern forms of governance and sovereignty in Western Europe. In the eyes of politicians, rebels, planners, and social scientists, the history of European state formation continues to provide powerful images of what a proper state should be. As Crawford Young suggests, ''Both colonialism and resistance to it yielded diffusion of a notion of stateness whose lineage lay in the European core'' (1994: 16) It is important, therefore, to come to grips with the historical specificities and contingencies that shaped that historical experience, as Mitchell Dean points out in his discussion of Foucault's work on sovereignty and biopolitics in this volume.
Instead of seeing state formation in the postcolonial world as a flawed imitation of a mature Western form, we need to disaggregate and historicize how the idea of the modern state became universalized and how modern forms of governance have proliferated throughout the world. Instead of talk-ing about the state as an entity that always/already consists of certain features, functions, and forms of governance, let us approach each actual state as a historically specific configuration of a range of languages of stateness, some practical, others symbolic and performative, that have been disseminated, translated, interpreted, and combined in widely differing ways and sequences across the globe.
Without pretending to be exhaustive, we single out three practical languages of governance and three symbolic languages of authority as particularly relevant for an ethnography of the state. The former are (1) the assertion of territorial sovereignty by the monopolization of violence by permanent and visible military and police forces; (2) the gathering and control of knowledge of the population-its size, occupations, production, and well-being-of this territory; and (3) the generation of resources and ensuring the reproduction and well-being of the population: in brief, development and management of the ''national economy.'' These languages of governance, always underpinned by knowledgegenerating techniques, have historically been disseminated, exchanged, and transplanted globally, including in the non-Western world. As we know, this has been a highly unequal exchange of technology, flowing mainly from the colonial powers to the colonies, later from the so-called developed worldcapitalist and socialist-to so-called underdeveloped countries. Today, ngos and international aid agencies have emerged as major transmitters of new administrative technologies in the field of development. This technology transfer and exchange has involved export of a range of techniques: how to set up secret services and military logistics, budgetary models and taxation systems, entire packages of ''high-intensity'' biopolitical governance such as state-of-the-art systems monitoring deforestation, participatory local development projects empowering women, and the structure and procedures adopted by commissions trying to produce the truth about past regimes or atrocities.
The larger and more imprecise imagination of the state as an expression of effective territorial sovereignty and authority capable of protecting and nurturing population and economy became from the 1940s on the dominant global form of political community. Expressed in the programs and rhetoric of nationalist movements in the colonial and postcolonial world, authorized by the un Charter, the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement and countless other documents, the nation-state is (or should be) a legitimate representation of the will and interests of its citizens. The production of states as not introduction 7 only loci of governance but centers of authoritative power has usually taken place through deployment of three symbolic languages of authority: (1) the institutionalization of law and legal discourse as the authoritative language of the state and the medium through which the state acquires discursive presence and authority to authorize; (2) the materialization of the state in series of permanent signs and rituals: buildings, monuments, letterheads, uniforms, road signs, fences; and (3) the nationalization of the territory and the institutions of the state through inscription of a history and a shared community on landscapes and cultural practices.
The first three are technical languages, the Foucauldian aspect, one may say, of practical governance, discipline, and productive biopolitical governance; the latter three are symbolic languages aiming at reproducing the imagination of the state as that specific authoritative center of a society in principle capable of issuing what Bourdieu calls the ''last judgment.'' None of these languages necessarily goes together or presupposes each other; each has distinct historical trajectories, meanings, and degrees of sophistication in every case and locality. The essential thing is, however, that a state exists only when these ''languages'' of governance and authority combine and coexist one way or the other. The decisive step in the invention of the modern nation-state was exactly when the sovereign state became entrusted with expanding tasks of managing the social and economic well-being of its people, to protect, reproduce, and educate its citizens, to represent the nation, its history, and its culture(s), and to reproduce boundaries and institutions enabling the political community to be recognized by other states as a proper state.
Exploring the state through ethnographies thus raises the question of the limits of government: Where does the state begin and end? What is the specificity of the state as opposed to other forms of authority and governance that exist alongside it-in communities, within enterprises, in localities, and in families? Standard governmental practices in general are not considered to be part of the political sphere. They may be everyday routine government actions such as census taking, primary health care programs, road construction, alphabetization programs-all routine practices undertaken by inconspicuous government employees. The fact that these routines are considered outside the domain of political contention and its variable languages, however, is of importance. In what ways do people talk about and act on these forms of government practices? Through what genres are narratives and knowledge of the state or the government circulated? How do these genres relate to more elaborate languages of political contention and the style in which state and governmental authority is imagined? These are some of the questions we suggest could be asked and explored anew. As shown by several of the contributions in this volume, stateness does not merely grow out of official, or ''stately,'' strategies of government and representation. The attribution of stateness to various forms of authority also emerges from intense and often localized political struggles over resources, recognition, inclusion, and influence. Whereas certain forms of state intervention may be loathed and resisted, other and more egalitarian forms of governance, or more benign forms of authority, may at the same time be intensely desired and asked for. Everyday forms of state power, in other words, are always suffused with and mediated by politics: contestation of authority, open defiance, as well as attempts to divert or privatize resources.
The centrality of the state to virtually every modern notion of a society thus means that the exploration of forms of state, stateness, and government inadvertently traverses a deeply normative ground. The state and modern governance is not something one can be for or against as such, for the simple reason that we cannot escape it. One can and should criticize specific forms of governance, undesirable institutions, and oppressive state practices, and many contributors in this volume do so. Implied in such critiques are not visions of the absence of government or the state as such, but rather the possibility of other, more humane and democratic forms of governance. While not ignoring that state power harbors the potential of unprecedented brutality in the name of a chilling dehumanized and scientistic utopia, as shown by Scott (1998), we advocate a more disaggregated and less essentializing study of the state by foregrounding the local, the emic, and the vernacular notions of governance, state authority, and resistance to state power. Instead of deploring the crisis or even collapse of postcolonial states in terms of the repercussions for regional stability (see, e.g., Zartman 1994), we find it more pertinent to explore the local and historically embedded ideas of normality, order, intelligible authority, and other languages of stateness. The constant recurrence of notions of stateness as a guarantee of order and ordinary life, shown by several contributors in this volume in various parts of the world, is thus not a barrier to critical engagement with the phenomenon of the state, but its most fundamental condition.
The contributions in this book are organized according to the three dimenintroduction 9
sions of the state outlined above: first, as technologies of governance encountered in the guise of classifications, forms to be filled in, rules to be obeyed, epistemologies learned, and so on; second, symbolic representations of the state as a locus and arbiter of justice and a symbol of a larger society; third, the invocations of the state as a set of institutions that can recognize, adjudicate, and authorize, that is, invest its authority in and give legitimacy to certain representatives, forms of community, public symbols, and also become loci of resistance and contestation. In the remainder of this introduction we unpack these aspects of state and politics and elaborate a bit on how each of the contributions in this volume feeds into them. At the same time, it is also pertinent to remember that the Western imagination of the state, however traversed by myths and historical fiction, remains the globally most powerful idea of political order in the twentieth century, institutionalized in the international state system after 1945. The most central presupposition underlying this system is that all states in principle are, or will become, similar, or at least mutually intelligible, in their structures and in the rationalities governing their actions. Such an ahistorical understanding of the state was eagerly embraced by the nationalist political elites in the postcolonial world, anxious to transform their states into ''normal'' nation-states. That task entailed, among other things, that the state was represented effectively to its citizens and communities and that it manifested itself effectively on its territory. As pointed out by Sarah Radcliffe in her piece on Ecuador, many states approached this task through a systematic production of a geo-graphical imagination. Through elaborate cartographies and education, the space of the state was domesticated as the proper place of the nation. This was the spatial matrix within which local communities hence could be inscribed, fixed, and ranked.
Other important interventions aiming at producing ''normal'' states were performed by development agencies, international donors, and the thrust of development theory that all supported the view of the state as an ''agent of modernization,'' an island of modernity and rationality, a part of the so-called modern sector, and so on. This conception obviously disregarded the fact that most colonial administrations were designed to exercise forms of governance and control of populations and territory that often were crudely extractive and much less fine-grained and less intensive than in the European homelands. As Mahmood Mamdani (1996a) has pointed out forcefully in the context of Africa, colonial administration often relied heavily on indirect rule, on a somewhat random brutality, and on local notables to whom many details of governance and tax collection were entrusted. As colonial administrations were turned into the backbone of the new postcolonial nation-states, their excessive centralization and bifurcation in rural and urban segments, their habits of summary governance at a distance, their lack of independent judiciaries, and the heavy-handed techniques deployed to control the majority of their populations were suddenly diagnosed as developmental flaws, as lack of modernity, as ''weak states.'' Reflecting on the ''flawed'' states in the non-Western world, Samuel Huntington opened his controversial book with the sentence ''The most important distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government'' (1968: 1). In his text Huntington acknowledged the capacity of communist movements to transform states into effective vehicles of governance, and he recommended, infamously, that the Western world should realize that states governed by so-called praetorian regimes were more likely to create order, stable institutions, and economic growth than democratic regimes likely to be overwhelmed and destabilized by the overload of expectations from a wide array of interest groups. Huntington was fascinated by the ability of strong governments to ''normalize'' the state apparatuses of developing societies, that is, to discipline them, extend them, make them capable of effective penetration of evermore social and economic relations.
Turning the state into an autonomous actor capable of swift social reform introduction 11
was, however, an agenda and a desire shared broadly across the political spectrum both within and outside the postcolonial world. Radical regimes in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East swept to power promising rapid modernization and strict social discipline, often blending elements of Soviet planning, militarization, and notions of secular modernity taken from Atatürk and Nasser. In Latin America dreams of using the state, and sometimes the military, in a rapid and pervasive drive for development, modernity, and recognition were nurtured by young radicals, bureaucrats, and officers. In the burgeoning development industry similar ideas of transformation through stronger and more effective governance were prominent, not so much aiming at national grandeur and recognition, but driven by desires to impart economic development, political stability, and techniques of poverty eradication to the postcolonial world. Much of this developmental desire meant that profoundly political issues of social transformation and institutional designs were depoliticized and put in the hands of developmental agencies and experts who transformed them into technocratic designs and further removed governance from the realm of the everyday, the vernacular, and the intelligible (Ferguson 1990).
As we know by now, many of these attempts to strengthen the state turned into outright authoritarian regimes that promoted the interests of narrow elites and, in effect, eroded the institutions and authority of the state. The existence of oligarchic structures of power, the organization of entrenched class interests, and the production of new, self-interested bureaucratic elites were obviously central to this development. Another problem was that the very form of the apparatuses employed to effect this grand transformation of the postcolonial societies bore the indelible mark of colonial designs just as the inventory of techniques employed in these tasks were steeped in colonial notions of control, policing, and summary governance of communities rather than citizens.
Colonial states, however, were never full-fledged states, Crawford Young (1994) reminds us. They had no sovereignty, no autonomy, no embedding in society and remained appendages to powerful European military and administrative complexes. The incompleteness and abnormality of the colonial state was in fact one of the central criticisms waged against imperial rule by nationalists, from the early ''Creole nationalists'' around Bolivar, to the founders of the Indian National Congress and nationalists throughout Africa. Young argues that ''the emergence of the colonial polity as a distinctive species of the state genus occurs as a process paralleling the development of the modern state'' (44). This means, argues Young, that our ideas of what a colonial state was, did, and wanted to achieve have to be historicized and seen in the context of the wider development of governmental technologies and political imaginaries at their time. There were, for instance, enormous differences among the maritime Portuguese empire bent on the ''revenue imperative'' (52), the Spanish empire organized around extension of regal power and the authority of the Church to new territories, and the austere mercantile rationalities governing the early British and Dutch empires. It was, Young reminds us, only in the nineteenth century that the European powers began the systematic construction of specific institutions aimed at governing the colonial populations and territories.
One corollary of this observation is that colonialism in Latin America had a complexion completely different from the high-noon imperialism that hit the African continent in the 1880s. The states of Latin America can hardly be regarded as postcolonial states in the same sense as their counterparts in Africa. The rationalities governing state practices in Latin America developed alongside those of Europe and North America, although in a mimetic relationship, as Michael Taussig (1997) has pointed out. For Taussig, the efforts at creating illusions of proper states in ''the European Elsewhere'' remain travestic, shot through with utopias and an (often absurd) zeal in the face of a colonial history that refuses to support any narrative of autochthonous authority (57-61). The desire to modernize, the eager embrace of cientismo and rational governance among national and local elites in large parts of Latin America were fueled by the circulation of the languages of stateness mentioned above, that is, new techniques of control and knowledge through which societies, communities, and selves could be improved, governed, and appreciated.
2 David Nugent's contribution to this volume gives an arresting illustration of how the desire to become modern also was a powerful impulse in political mobilizations in Peru in the first half of the twentieth century. In a different and yet related context, Tim Mitchell (1988) has shown how nineteenth-century Egypt was (self-)colonized without overt colonialism through the internalization of scientific genres of knowledge, modern methods of administration and surveillance, and styles of cultural self-objectification through European registers by Egyptian intellectuals and administrators.
But the feasibility of governmental technologies was always constrained by the location of a state in the wider international economy and by the reintroduction 13 sources and revenues at its disposal in the domestic economy. As Fernando Coronil reminds us in his study of the formation of the Venezuelan oil economy, ''In capitalist societies, command over persons rests in the hands of the state, while command over resources lies in the hands of capital'' (1997: 64). His study forcefully demonstrates how the modern Venezuelan state was restructured and reimagined as the country emerged as a leading oil producer in the world but also a captive in the larger global economy, completely dependent on foreign technology and global oil prices. Not only were state policies reconfigured around this abundant resource, oil was also introduced into the dominant political imagination as Venezuela was reconstructed as a modern ''oil nation'': the sublated unity of a natural body (s-oil) and a timeless collective body of the people, the nation (67-117).
It is these actually existing forms of governance and the trajectories of institutions and representations of the state in various parts of the postcolonial world that this volume explores. Throughout we try to avoid the usual negative prefixes (weak, disorganized, incoherent, illegitimate, deinstitutionalized, etc.) that still enframe the problematics and the puzzles to be solved in most political science and development studies literature on the postcolonial state. One of the most promising avenues away from this deadlock is to disaggregate the state into the multitude of discrete operations, procedures, and representations in which it appears in the everyday life of ordinary people. By treating the state as a dispersed ensemble of institutional practices and techniques of governance we can also produce multiple ethnographic sites from where the state can be studied and comprehended in terms of its effects, as well as in terms of the processes that shape bureaucratic routines and the designs of policies.
State, Violence, and Justice: Between Imaginary and Apparatus However analytically useful it is to denaturalize the state and to get beyond the state's own prose and problematics of social order and development, we should not forget that the notion of the state probably remains the most powerful lens through which society, nation, and even the ubiquitous but elusive notion of ''the economy'' is imagined. The modern state is not just a set of rationalities or institutional forms. It has also acquired vital mythological dimensions that give its authority both historical aura and weight. The ''myth of the state'' that Ernst Cassirer (1946) saw as a malign product of fascist and organicist ideology is, we would argue, absolutely crucial to the organization and the experience of coherence and order of modern societies in most parts of the world. The entire idea of political legitimacy, of the difference between naked power and authority, the idea that ''the Law'' is something that stands above the contingencies of everyday life and incarnates a certain collective justice, the crucial discourse of rights as something that once defined and authorized become unassailable and inalienable: all hinge on the perpetuated myth of the state's coherence and ability to stand ''above society,'' as it were.
Since Hobbes theorized the absolutist state, European notions of political power and the state have undoubtedly been starkly reductionist. To paraphrase Hobbes: ''Covenants without the sword are but words,'' and at the basis of the state, of power, of legitimacy, we find, purely and simply, violence. In this view, royal pomp, state rituals, and modern ideological formation essentially serve to efface and occlude this foundational violence, which is the origin of a state. Clifford Geertz has called this ''the great simple that remains through all sophistications . . . politics, finally, is about mastery: Women and Horses, Power and War' ' (1980: 134) . This, argues Geertz, has led to an unfortunate blindness toward the importance of symbols and ideas in their own right to statecraft and state power. Geertz retrieves the importance of this in his study of the classical Balinese theater state, the negara, a polity whose basis of sovereignty was its status as ''an exemplary center-a microcosm of the supernatural order.'' Pomp, ritual, and spectacle were not devices to represent the state or occlude its violent nature; they constituted the core of the state that was based on the ''controlling idea that by providing a model . . . a faultless image of civilized existence, the court shapes the world around it'' (13). The dramas of that polity were neither lies nor illusions, concludes Geertz: ''They were what there was'' (136).
The negara should remind us that there are languages of stateness other than those invented in Europe in the past two centuries but also that the rationality of intent, purpose, and action often imputed to modern statesby the analyst as well as the citizen-subject-tends to occlude the important mythical dimensions of the modern state. Maybe it is the very idea of state actions as guided by an abstract, omniscient, and rational intelligenceceaselessly celebrated and vilified in novels and films on spies and intelligence agencies-that constitutes the very core of the myth of the modern state.
The widespread idea of the state as a thing is indeed at odds with basic introduction 15 tendencies in how states develop. As modern forms of governmentality penetrate and shape human life in unprecedented ways, the practices and sites of governance have also become ever more dispersed, diversified, and fraught with internal inconsistencies and contradictions. This has not necessarily weakened the state in terms of the capacity of policies and designs to create social effects. The strength of the modern state seems, on the contrary, to be its dispersion and ubiquity. The modern states of, say, Western Europe are today more diverse, more imprecise in their boundaries vis-à-vis other forms of organization, more privatized or semiprivatized than ever before, more integrated in supranational structures and yet apparently stronger than ever before. The new role of the state is, Helmut Wilke (1992) has argued, to supervise governance by semiprivate organizations, local authorities, selfgoverning bodies of all kinds, ngos, and so on, rather than to actually govern directly.
The neoliberal attempts to restructure and trim the apparatuses of postcolonial states, originally designed for ''low-intensity governance,'' along similar lines, however, have rarely produced a similar flexibility and enhanced capacity. The predominant organization of postcolonial governance as ''command policies'' have meant that imf-prescribed delegation of powers to the local level of the state more often than not has produced deep fragmentation, lack of coordination, and an undermining of the notion of the state as a guarantee of social order. For subject populations or citizens, the experience of the state has, in many cases (e.g., in the postcommunist world), changed from a frightening Kafkaesque labyrinth of impersonal power into the random brutality of a state parceled into smaller fiefdoms run by local bureaucrats and police officers. In the more extreme cases of state collapse, as witnessed in western and central Africa in the 1990s, state administration ceases to be a factor in everyday life, which is thrown back in an almost Hobbesian state where raw military might emerge as the ultimate basis of legitimacy. Even then, amid chaos and bloodshed, some warlords attempt to create zones of stability and to erect something resembling a state: taxation instead of random plunder, dispensation of ''justice'' through courtlike ritual instead of instant killings, territorial control, and, in some cases, appeal to subjects in the name of a shared community or destiny.
There is little doubt that a mythology of the coherence, knowledge, and rationalities of the (ideal) state exists, thrives, and empowers many otherwise widely discrepant practices. This myth is carefully cultivated inside the bu-reaucracy and among political figures as the state's own myth of itself and is constantly enacted through grand state spectacles, stamps, architecture, hierarchies of rank, systems of etiquette, and procedures within the vast expanse of the bureaucracy. But do these elaborate state rituals actually manage to create or reproduce a state mythology coherent enough for the state to impose itself on populations with effective authority? Or are these spectacles and rituals of the state more for internal consumption among bureaucrats, clerks, accountants, officers-a daily, routinized reassurance of the importance and power of the state that actually serves to strengthen the sense of a unified stateness of dispersed forms of government?
Drawing on Foucault's insights regarding the specifically modern reorganization of space and time into routinized, repetitive, and internalized disciplines and forms of surveillance, Mitchell (1999) argues that the ''appearance of structures'' on the basis of these micro-operations seems to be one of the most fundamental features of modernity in general and the preeminent feature of the ''state effect'' that modern governmentality produces. The state is the ''abstraction of political practices'' analogous to the way capital is the abstraction appearing from labor: ''We must analyze the state . . . not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, apparently metaphysical effect of practices'' (89). The multiple practices involved in policing and controlling territorial boundaries is that which creates the nation-state as effect, The question is how these insights can be given historical substance and differentiality and how we can create ethnographic sites from where such ''state abstractions'' can be studied. One obvious, if very underdeveloped type of study is that of the bureaucracy itself: its routines, its personnel and their internal cultures, gestures, and codes, its mode of actual production of authority and effects by the drafting of documents, uses of linguistic genres, and so on: in brief, an anthropology of the policy process that looks at it as ritual and as production of meaning rather than production of effective policies per se. Michael Herzfeld's (1992) work on the symbolic registers developed by Western bureaucracy has laid out valuable conceptual groundwork for such studies but has not been followed by thorough ethnographic work that could demonstrate its wider relevance. Herzfeld's own text manages to produce only brief but highly interesting ethnographic illustrations of the imbrications of bureaucratic categories and idioms and everyday life, mainly introduction 17 from contemporary Greece. Lars Buur's analysis in this volume of the minutiae of the everyday workings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission represents another example of how anthropological sensibilities applied to the routines, rituals, and underlying assumptions of legaladministrative practices can yield valuable insights.
The discourse of rights that has assumed such critical importance in international politics and has given rise to a whole new human rights sector within the development industry is also centrally linked to the myth of the state. As much as the Law as a concept depends on the state's mythical qualities, the practices of solemnly encoding certain rights in constitutions, of entrenching and interpreting these rights in judicial practices and invoking them in political rhetoric also hinges on the efficiency of the imagination of the state as a guarantor of these rights. If that imagination is ineffective, the discourse of rights is inconsequential.
Even more important, if the legal apparatus of the state is unable to translate these abstract rights into actual and effective judgments that prescribe precise entitlements that can affect people's lives or empower them, the appeal to a larger notion of rights makes no sense. Instead, local communities engage in small and inconspicuous acquisitions of entitlements-to land, customs, employment, and so on. Rachel Sieder's contribution analyzes the protracted efforts in Guatemala to develop new and more inclusive forms of citizenship in a society characterized by deep and enduring differences between an elite ''owning'' the state and the large Indian communities. In Sieder's analysis it is apparent that encoding rights in legislation is not a question of handing down entitlements to grateful subjects, but a complex negotiation of how existing entitlements stipulated in customary law and localized settlements can be codified and inscribed in more durable and abstract rights. Thus, the case illustrates how one of the most powerful languages of stateness-the codification of social relations in law-works in processes of state formation at the turn of the century.
Another way of studying the myth of the state is to regard it as a form of ''social fantasy'' circulating among citizens and communities. This fantasy is produced and reproduced by numerous encounters, everyday forms of defiance and obedience, ranging from fantasies of the mighty and evil state hatching hyperrational designs (a genre popular among radical groups on the left as well as on the far right) to popular genres of conspiracy theories that often impute almost superhuman omniscience and omnipresence to politi-cal leaders and agencies of the state. These genres represent widespread, popular, and highly interesting points of access to how the state is mythologized, externalized, and abstracted from ordinary existence yet is believed to be omnipresent. Achille Mbembe's (1992) well-known and controversial depiction of the obscenity and absurdity connected with public exercise of state power in the ''postcolony,'' in casu Cameroon, points to the importance of the state as an entity manifesting itself in spectacles. To Mbembe, the impulse of state power in the postcolonial world, due to its origin in a system of excessively violent, colonial power, is organized around an equally excessive fantasy of making the imperatives of the state, commandement, the hegemonic center of society. But this is impossible because ''the postcolony is chaotically pluralistic and . . . it is in practice impossible to create a single, permanently stable system out of all the signs, images and markers current in the postcolony . . . this is why, too, the postcolony is, par excellence, a hollow pretence, a regime of unreality (régime du simulacre)'' (8).
Mbembe takes popular forms of ridiculing of power, jokes of a sexual nature about the men in power, their bodily functions, appetite, and so on, as examples of how this hollowness of state power is dealt with. In itself, there is nothing African or even postcolonial about such joking about the elevated and yet profane representations of power. 4 But the specifically postcolonial feature, Mbembe suggests, is the way the state is excessively fetishized in pomp, ritual, and entertainment, and the way these spectacles are disarmed but also domesticated through jokes and humor to an extent that there is a coexistence or conviviality between the official and the everyday world: ''In fact officialdom and the people have many references, not the least of which is a certain conception of the aesthetics and the stylistics of power . . . it must furnish public proof of its prestige by a sumptuous presentation of status'' (9).
Mbembe's argument is that to be legitimate, power must be represented within already established registers of pomp. The holders of power must present themselves as firm but also generous and endowed with an excessive appetite. This resonates with J. F. Bayart's (1991) argument that African politics remain organized around specific discursive registers that often predate colonialism, such as the ''politics of the belly,'' understood both as a practical politics of feeding populations and a symbolics of power around metaphors of eating and digesting. Mbembe uses the execution of two prisoners in Cameroon and the cheering crowds gathered to witness it as an example of this introduction 19 specific mode of postcolonial power that thrives on a certain measure of complicity and involvement of broader sections of the population through enjoyment. Unlike the excruciating torture and execution of Damiens for regicide that Foucault made famous in the opening pages of Discipline and Punish, the execution in Cameroon was organized more like a theater celebrating the splendor of the state. To Mbembe, the grotesque (and ineffective) character of power in the postcolony is revealed in its lack of seriousness, its indulgence, its theatrical and obscene nature, and its successful involvement of the population in ''cheap imitations of power so as to reproduce its epistemology'' (1992: 29).
Taussig has also recently explored how the idea of the state is fetishized through a range of magical transactions and spectacles, from spirit possessions to official textbooks and monuments, in a Latin American country. Not unlike Mbembe's work, a sense of the absurd and surreal suffuses the representations of power that ceaselessly revolve around stories and images of the ''Liberator'' (Bolivar), his court, his black general Paez, later elevated to the status of El Negro Primero, a figure that connotes a primitivity and virile power of the plains, both loathed and desired by the urban elites (Taussig 1997: 94 -95); the death of Bolivar, his second funeral on South American soil as the founding moment of the state, and the rumors that his heart had been removed ''to live on in every South American'' (104). The story about how a commander of the m-19 guerrillas in 1974, Alvaro Fayad, stole the Liberator's sword, the ultimate fetish of the state, from a museum is particularly arresting. The communist guerrillas were at first indifferent to such symbols, but once in their possession they, too, fetishized the ''thing,'' wrapped it in multiple layers of cloth and plastic so that it literally grew and grew to such a size that it stuck out of the trunk of a car and had to have a small red flag tied to it in traffic! This state ''thing'' disappeared, and rumor has it that it was given to Castro (190 -95). Taussig's point is close to Mbembe's: state power is fetishized through displays and spectacles but becomes effective as authority only because it invades, and is appropriated by, everyday epistemologies of power, of the magical, the spiritual, and the extraordinary.
In his work on the role of spirit mediums during the guerrilla war in Zimbabwe, David Lan (1985) also points to the crucial role of spirit mediums, mhondoros, in legitimizing the struggle of the Zimbabwe African National Union (zanu-pf) in what became known as ''the second Chimurenga,'' the second war of liberation. Lan shows how the spirit mediums, being in con-tact with the ancestral spirits, gradually shifted their loyalty to the liberation movement, which had a decisive effect on the course of the war. As independence was announced on the newly renamed Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, it was followed by a zanu song celebrating the spirit of Grandmother Nehanda, who had been in the first Chimurenga (in 1896) and in the second as well (217-18). In the following months and years, this ''nationalization of the mhondoros'' continued, and the picture of Nehanda was always placed above that of Mugabe at official functions. It appears that some of the spirit mediums later shifted their loyalties away from the ruling party, but nationalization was in a sense complete when the new state authorized the association of traditional healers to practice as doctors, and when spirit mediums were given a special license under this association and the right to use the letters ''sm'' (!) in advertising and official communication (219 -20).
These and other works have opened a field that approaches the construction of the state in everyday life, although they remain within conventional areas of anthropological research: magic, spirits, the body. Several of the contributions in this volume attempt to approach more routinized and less dramatic forms of folk theories of the state and of political authority. Fiona Wilson's analysis in this volume of the narrative of a rural schoolteacher in Peru demonstrates rather strikingly how notions of the proper nation-to-be, of modernity, of the ideal Peruvian peasant exist in forms that in many ways are separated from the actually existing state in the area. Oskar Verkaaik also illustrates the pertinence of rumors of intelligence, informers, and the supposed ''capture'' of the state by ethnic conspiracies in contemporary Pakistan.
However, in many cases the myth of the state is actually sustained by the rather mundane practices of authorization and recognition carried out by the state: the acts of authorizing marriages and registration of deaths and births, the recognition of deputations or representatives of communities or interests as legitimate and reasonable and thus entitled to be consulted in policy matters, the certification by the state of institutions, professions, exams, standards, and so on. Such practices reproduce the myth of the state by literally implanting it in people's lives, as revered documents carefully stored or proudly displayed on the walls, as stamps, permits, titles from where certain entitlements, social status, and respect flow. The upholding of a certain image of the state as a revered object of respect and authority is often vital to the status, livelihood, and identity of millions of people. Nowhere is the importance and dependence on the mythological dimensions of the state more introduction 21 pathetically represented than in the profound disillusion one can read in the rugged faces of elderly Russians, desperately displaying their medals and distinctions from the Soviet era in the vain hope of extracting a minimum of respect when receiving their pensions that now are reduced to mere crumbs. A great many of the institutions that governed the everyday life of Soviet citizens are still in place and many of the routines are unchanged, but the power of the myth of the state has vanished.
In her thoughtful piece, Aletta Norval deals with another instance of the vanishing of one type of state, the South African apartheid state, and the imaginative attempt to provide the new order, the New South Africa, with a new authorized national history through the narrative built by the proceedings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This is a history of evil and its exorcising, of forgiving and overcoming, but it is also, crucially, an attempt to reduce a more fundamental sense of undecidability and to conceal the impossibility of complete reconciliation.
State, Community, Hegemony, and the Art of Politics
A number of contributions to this volume deal with the relationship between the state and ''its other,'' the social identities, practices, and allegiances that states ''are formed against,'' to use Corrigan and Sayer's expression (1985: 7). The notion of community is often used to depict the other of the state, whether local, political, religious, or other communities, that are imagined to be located outside, but in relation to, the state. Much of the recent discussion of the nature and dynamics of this relationship draws on the notion of hegemony, thus posing the question of how noncoercive forms of domination are constituted and how communities are brought within the purview of the state.
In particular, remembering Gramsci's preoccupation with practical politics and the construction of intellectual and moral leadership, we may ask about the importance and dynamics of politics, understood as a distinct social field, in relation to the constitution, negotiation, and change of state-centered hegemonies. In other words, how do political operators control or transform the state on behalf of specific economic and social groups?
In this volume, the relation between politics and the state is explored in two different ways. Several of the contributions deal with popular perceptions of politics as something that tends to ''pollute'' the state, and the state as something that can be ''conquered'' or ''captured'' through politics. In Karachi and Hyderabad, rumors depict the Pakistani state as captured by Punjabis and feed into the sense of displacement and loss so pivotal to Muhajir identity, as shown by Verkaaik. In his essay on legal inquest and policing in contemporary Mumbai, Thomas Blom Hansen shows how police officers and social workers share the conviction that the ''politicization of the state'' constitutes an obstacle to effective and rational governance. This diagnosis of competitive politics as the very source of the decay, corruption, and weakening of the state is shared widely by bureaucrats, development workers, social scientists, journalists, and certainly millions of ordinary people in contemporary India.
A different way of exploring the relations between politics and the state is in the context of radical political changes when new governments elaborate strategies and policies for profound reforms of the state, in this volume represented by the essays on the current South African transition. Within political science this theme is often discussed under the rubric of regime or form of regime, one of three dimensions of governance: state (the notion of the state as legal and military structures of considerable permanence), government (the wider institutional structures and administrative procedures), and regime (the political organization and will in power). Although this is a necessary unpacking of the term state, it is clearly not radical enough to allow for any ethnographic exploration of the state and state-community relations.
As noted by David Nugent (1994), the bulk of the literature on state-society relations argue on the basis of an implicit model that posits two abstractions, state and community, as two essential and bounded entities in opposition to each other. One is seen as essentially expanding, transforming, and coercive, the other as essentially conservative and actively resisting imposed transformations. This, however, is only one of several possible ''junctures'' of statecommunity relations. In the present volume, Nugent himself shows how the imagery of this kind of state-community opposition in the case of Chachapoyas, Peru, is an outcome of a historically specific process of transformation from the 1930s to the 1980s. In the 1930s, in the context of an emerging populist regime, the petit bourgeois Chachapoyanos were actively involved in producing themselves as a community of citizens, as well as the state as an effectively ruling apparatus in the province. But from the late 1960s, relations have deteriorated and the community has developed into an antimodern, antistatist ''traditionalism'' depicting the state as external and imposing.
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Finn Stepputat shows how village populations in postconflict Guatemala engage in a similar, not necessarily coerced, extension of state institutions. Intertwined with struggles for communal leadership and collective recognition, many villagers strive to develop their places into urbanlike, formal sites of governance with public services, offices, parks, and other elements that symbolize the recognition of communities of citizens. In the process, ''local community'' is stabilized as a territorial, administrative entity, an interface between state and population. In this sense, the labeling and institutionalization of a village-community works as a kind of enframing of segments of the population (Mitchell 1988). The struggle for state-centered yet autonomous urbanization feeds the local appropriations of the system of political representation and contributes to the creation of a space of local politics: the''politics from here'' as opposed to the (less legitimate) ''politics from there.'' Martijn van Beek offers us a different example of state-community relations in which the introduction of bureaucratic categories of inclusion evokes practices of representation and belonging that go beyond the ''either resistance or compliance'' dichotomy. Analyzing the process leading to political autonomy for Ladakh in India, van Beek shows convincingly that ethnicization and communalization is the price for being included in the liberal democracies of the contemporary world of nations. At the same time, however, the British colonial fear of ''communalism'' and the posterior denial of communalism in India have premised the specific form of political representation of the Ladakhi. They have been recognized and granted autonomy as eight different tribes. Such exclusive categories are at odds with the disorder of social practices of identification in Ladakh, but because tribalism and communalism are extremely powerful images in this context, the population engages in everyday dissimulations in order to practice the exclusivist categories of political inclusion.
Contrary to the school of subaltern studies, our usage of the notion of community is not a priori; it is not referring to a more or less autonomous repository or space of resistance to domination, homogenization, and disciplinary techniques. In spite of his relational analysis of the formation of community, Partha Chatterjee, for example, sticks to a binary opposition, not between ''state and civil society'' but between ''capital and community '' (1993: 13) . Like the abstractions of people or ''the popular''-usually defined through negativity, as opposed to elite and elite ways of doing things-community is imagined either as something good, pure, and authentic or as something dangerous, unpredictable, and ungovernable, as in the above case of India. Genealogically, these opposed imageries of community and state can be traced to the tension between romanticism and rationalism in the European tradition (Hansen 1997a).
Insofar as the notion of community is locked in an opposition to modern, rational society it calls for images of localization, boundedness, reciprocity, and so on, but also of tradition, backwardness, parochiality, and immobility. Such images are often invoked in paternalist governmental or nongovernmental interventions on behalf of the communities, such as those promoted by the indigenista movement in several Latin American countries. Here anthropologists and other urban intellectuals developed policies and techniques for the integration of ''backward'' and ''humiliated'' indigenous people into the nation-state. Several progressive governments have taken this ensemble of images, policies, and techniques on board, for example, in Mexico after the revolution.
An increasing number of studies have shown how state-centered representations have worked to incorporate communities in a hierarchically organized yet homogeneous nation-state through strategies that relate certain identities to certain spaces, time sequences, substances, and so on (e.g., Urban and Scherzer 1991; Coronil and Shursky 1991; Rowe and Schelling 1991; see also Alonso 1994) . Who are at the center, who are at the margins? Who belong to the past of the nation, who belong to the future? In this way, representations tend to naturalize some groups occupying positions in government or in the political system and other groups occupying inferior positions. However, we need more studies to scrutinize the institutional aspects of such hegemonic strategies. We have to ask how the opposition and the boundaries between state and communities have come into being, which differences and identities that have been subsumed are the main opposition to the state, how relations are organized and negotiated across the boundaries, how communities are represented, and by whom. Community may well be represented differently by different politicians, by schoolteachers, and by other contenders for leadership positions.
In her study of one of the many marginal regions in contemporary Indonesia, Anna Tsing notes that the formation of local leadership is of vital importance in the incorporation of the region into Indonesia's dominant languages of stateness: ''At the border between state rule and the wild stand introduction 25 those who dare to define, defy and demand administration. These are the men whom I call 'leaders' because they are ambitious enough to tell the government that they represent the community and their neighbors that they represent the state' ' (1993: 72) . Tsing shows the multiple roles performed by these men as brokers between governmental agencies and the community they bring into existence in a clear form, but also how these roles produce an authority that is employed in settling local disputes within the communities' own discursive registers and practices, such as marriage cases (127-53). The paradox is that as these marginal areas are subjected to more intensive governance, the importance of these men tends to recede: ''Local leaders invoke the authority of the state, but often lose out if the state arrives'' (151).
5
The contributions in this volume share an understanding of hegemony as a process of constructing ''not a shared ideology but a common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon social orders characterized by domination'' (Roseberry 1994: 361). In this sense state-community relations may be interpreted as hegemonic processes that over time develop ''a common discursive framework'': a shared, stateauthorized language of cognition, control, and contestation. An important feature of such a framework is the formation and delimitation of a distinct field of politics, including the definition of specific spaces for politics and a common ''language of contention'' for struggle and negotiation among different political actors (363).
This perspective allows us to scrutinize the complex processes through which certain phenomena become objects of political debate and eventually political intervention, and others not; how ideological formations produce distinctions between the politically permissible and nonpermissible, between proper public conduct and improper. Transitions, for example, from conflict to postconflict or from one political regime to another, are privileged contexts for the investigation of ways that regimes pursue and negotiate inclusions and exclusions from the limelight of the political field.
In other words, the delimitation of the field of politics defines the boundary between undisputed, naturalized, and commonsensical doxa and the heterodoxa of politically disputed alternatives-at least in the discursive genres that symbolically constitute stateness, such as the distinctive bureaucratic ''legalese.'' At the heart of the doxa of the political field are the professional languages and the concepts and categories by which social and political sciences analyze state, economy, and politics. These forms of knowledge do not exist outside or independently of the state but are vital components in dominant ideological formations that try to define the character and limits of the state, how politics is supposed to be conducted, how institutions should function, and so on. They are, in other words, intrinsic to the symbolic production of stateness. As Mitchell (1999) has shown persuasively, the emergence of political science as a discipline in postwar America was indeed informed by the larger fear of communist expansion and by a quest for American global hegemony. It also became a highly influential analytical and disciplinary technique that sought to devise a certain universal and ''normalizing'' conceptual vocabulary within which ''state,'' ''political system,'' ''society,'' and ''economy'' could be understood as discrete and concrete entities available for analysis and amenable to governmental intervention (77-80).
In the same vein, but at a different level, Akhil Gupta's analysis in this volume of an extension program for anganwadis (day care centers) in North India points usefully to the way in which ostensibly technocratic schemes have profoundly political effects. Gupta shows how the program problematizes gender inequality as a developmental problem, and how the official depiction of increased independence of women as a possible source of development and economic gain slowly encroaches on older discourses on gender. This practical reconceptualization of gender may over time contribute to the transformation of gender relations in North Indian villages, although not necessarily in the emancipatory direction envisaged by the policymakers.
Hegemony thus also works through the development of technocratic programs and institutions that govern by virtue of routines, internal bureaucratic logics, and allotted resources without being directed by political forces in any strict sense. In this sense, hegemony is diffuse and difficult to pin down. If we further consider the complexity of governance in modern, politically pluralist, and decentralized states where politicians and bureaucratic bodies at different administrative levels may dispute decisions, divert programs, and struggle over jurisdictional boundaries, it becomes very difficult to perceive of hegemony as being closed, monolithic, and coordinated. Compared to the older and more centralized apparatus inherited from the colonial powers, it is undoubtedly much more difficult to dominate and control a multilayered and intensely competitive system of democratic government that has emerged in many postcolonial societies.
Partha Chatterjee (1998) has argued recently that conventional distinctions between state and civil society are unable to capture the richness and speciintroduction 27 ficity of the actually existing forms of political struggle one finds in postcolonial societies. The state and civil society belong, he argues, to the same conceptual world of orderly negotiation of interests properly organized and conducted according to certain rules and conventions: ''The institutions of modern associational life [were] set up by nationalist elites in the era of colonial modernity . . . [and] embody the desire of this elite to replicate in its own society the forms as well as substance of Western modernity'' (62). Against such a yardstick of formal and educated debate and organization most forms of politics and negotiations of power in the postcolonial world inevitably appear chaotic and lacking in purpose and formality, Chatterjee suggests. Instead, he coins the term ''political society'' for the zone of negotiations and mediations between state and population, wherein the main mediators are movements, political parties, informal networks, and many other channels through which the developmental state and the vast majority of the population interact. This distinction between civil and political society is pertinent and highly relevant. If we are to understand how issues of welfare and questions of rights and democracy are negotiated in the postcolonial world, we need to understand the dynamics, the tacit rules, and the historicity of its many political societies.
However, the rough and tumble of competitive politics at many levels does not necessarily mean that hegemony is ineffective. On the contrary, a low level of political and ideological coordination, a diffuse nature of power, a nonreflexive routinization of governance and political processes, and a commonsensical acceptance of the domination of political life by certain groups and families may well be what make hegemony endure. But if this is the case we must consider the question of how, or if, political operators are able to establish control and alter hegemonic relations through the state apparatus.
The Art of Politics
To understand how political forces deal with the state, how they seek to address and reproduce the constituencies and social interests they consolidated (or created) on their road to political office, we need to analyze more carefully, and with more ethnographic precision, what ruling parties do when they rule.
Assuming political power does not mean that a new government can change institutional routines overnight or that social practices within the bureaucracy can be easily modified. The state is an enormous and amorphous mechanism that functions along a whole range of discrete and often self-perpetuating logics, bereft of any unifying and encompassing rationale. For a new political regime to be effective in implementing parts of its professed objectives, it needs to produce a fairly coherent ''state project,'' as Bob Jessop (1990) has argued. Jessop suggests that political forces that desire to transform a society must let themselves be absorbed in thoroughgoing institutional reforms and in a certain reinvention of the state. Governance and attempts to transform social structures through administrative reform in the main do take place inside the technocratic confines of government departments. Only insofar as a thorough reform of institutions take place, as it happens at the behest of anc in South Africa right now or as the Congress Party gradually brought about in India in the 1950s and 1960s, may we legitimately talk of a political force actually dominating the state in any meaningful sense.
But often, such structural reforms are not carried through. Yesterday's revolutionary regimes end up focusing on political changes of symbolic value or on crude nationalism rather than on implementing structural reform. The case of Zimbabwe, where revolutionary rhetoric has been combined with the persistence of a colonial structure of landholding and agricultural economy, immediately comes to mind. Without exaggeration, we might say that most contemporary societies remain governed by yesterday's administrative systems and procedures.
Bearing this relative ''ungovernability'' and inertia of the state in mind, the issue of how ruling parties rule and how we can study the ways political operators operate may be restated in a slightly more precise form. We mention only three of the modes of direct political intervention in the processes of governance that authors in this volume touch on:
1. Prior to any major change in policies or institutions, most governments will appoint committees to review an area, conceptualize the problems, and recommend solutions in white papers or reports. Such committees are often staffed by senior bureaucrats whose own entrenchment in the social world and the languages of the bureaucracy ensures that their diagnosis remains within the dominant discourse and the proposed amendments of governmental techniques remain moderate and gradual. Within well-established sectors with complex and closely woven networks of entitlements, systems of rank and promotion, and so on, reforms are often extremely difficult to push through. Certain sectors of the governmental apparatus, due to their origins in the colonial order or a military or authoritarian legacy, have been allotted introduction 29 considerable autonomy and over time have developed extremely resilient forms of organization, recruitment, and functioning that few political parties dare to confront. The military, the police, the system of prisons and correctional institutions are often such almost self-governing institutions within the larger network of the state. Although the state as a whole may be fragmented and ''weak,'' we need to take note of varying degrees of ''softness'' and ''hardness'' in different sectors of the state apparatus. It is in the face of this problem of resilience and reluctance toward reform and scrutiny within the security apparatuses that a range of ''truth-producing'' technologies and strategies of reconciliation have been employed by new and democratic regimes in Latin America and South Africa. Instead of an all-out confrontation with the often unrepenting executioners of yesteryear, these processes have sought to bypass the security apparatuses and instead create a common platform for a broader and collective catharsis of the excesses of past regimes.
2. It is tempting for political parties eager to show results to create new governmental institutions or programs instead of reforming or terminating those in existence because of the web of entitlements, resources, and institutional routines surrounding a given sector. New programs and discourses are believed to be able to bypass and displace older and existing structures by virtue of the energy and hegemonic strategies pursued by a new regime. This intricate play between older forms of governance and new forms of rationalities seeking to hegemonize a field of intervention lies at the heart of Steffen Jensen's paper in this volume on the attempts to reproblematize the field of crime, policing, and correctional institutions in South Africa.
The result seems to be that each new regime builds a number of new institutions or nurses particular areas with greater care and zeal, often reflecting the larger ideological formations and communities out of which they have emerged. In intensely competitive democratic setups, the result seems to be that each political movement or party seeks to establish and maintain zones of loyalty, reproduced through flows of patronage, in various parts of the bureaucracy. It is a process that, needless to say, often brings forth the intrinsic fragmentation of the state to an extent that sometimes jeopardizes its central mythological dimensions. The long-term result of such competing and successive projects of domination and social reform through constant formation, addition, and restructuring of state institutions is a morphology of governance, that is, historical layers of institutions that left traces and documents as they were reformed or rebuilt. Such morphologies can be in-valuable texts in our understanding of the dynamics of broader conflicts between social classes and communities. David Nugent's exploration of state formation and the struggle over political power and designs of institutions in Peru in this century is a fine example of the insights such an approach can yield.
3. The most widely used and most immediately effective method used by political force to exercise power and to consolidate its popularity and support is intervention into the implementation and administration of specific policies and regulations at the local level. When lists of those entitled to new agricultural credits are drawn up, when children are admitted into government schools and colleges, when new clerks are employed in a government department, when liquor licenses are issued, when builders are allowed to build on certain plots-the list is endless-local politicians are often involved in putting pressure on local officials. National-level politicians are involved in similar efforts, only on a larger scale concerning the sanctioning of large industrial projects or large construction projects.
This part of the political vocation involves the ability to construct a large network of contacts, mutual favors, and economic resources that enable political operators to put pressure on a local bureaucrat (threats concerning possible transfers are common) or to win influence in local boards and commissions, to make friends with influential bureaucrats, and to rise in their own political party. From the point of view of the consumer of government services, this local art of politics also requires a certain command of the ''rules of game'' as well as the discursive register through which bribes and kickbacks are talked about and constructed as reasonable within a local cultural economy, as Gupta's (1995) path-breaking paper on corruption demonstrated. In a similar, if more generalizing, vein, de Sardan (1999) has recently pointed to a range of cultural logics and everyday forms of reciprocity and obligation in sub-Saharan Africa that contribute to the reproduction of what he terms the ''corruption complex.'' A very substantial part of the everyday forms of governance and political power is exercised this way. Police constables are told to look the other way or to arrest someone particular. The name of one farmer is deleted from the loan scheme and the relative of a leading family is entered instead. Municipal authorities are told to ignore the construction of unauthorized buildings. Examples are legion.
This form of power, however, cannot easily be equated with the power of certain classes or communities, nor can it necessarily be taken as proof of the introduction 31 power of one particular party. Most political figures are involved in this ''political retailing'' that has very little to do with dominating or restructuring the state, but merely with influencing the course of a few of the micro-operations of the state. But the net result of these millions of everyday interventions in the functioning of local institutions is, of course, that governance becomes increasingly ''porous'' and fragmented at the local level and that the implementation of most policies are deflected, if not stunted.
Resisting Regimes
The category of resistance remains a very unclear and opaque term in spite of the enormous literature on the subject in all the disciplines of the social sciences. Much like the state-community dichotomy discussed above, the very definition and conceptualization of resistance, of defiance or insurgency is vitally dependent on the character and clarity of the regime, or state, that is opposed. Resistance, most anthropologists, historians, and sociologists agree, is a category and a type of social practice that cannot be understood or presupposed outside its historical context. Yet, there is something universal and transhistorical in the way resistance is conceptualized and assumed. This was true of Marxist scholarship but also applies to contemporary work of a poststucturalist persuasion, inspired among other things by Foucault's remark ''Where there is power there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power' ' (1978: 95 -96 ). This remark seems to affirm resistance as an anthropological universal, something that is always/already out there. If we cannot see ''it,'' our conceptual tools must be inadequate and insensitive to the localized and emic categories that are the medium of resistance. But Foucault's notion of the imbrication of resistance in every operation of power has, along with work by James Scott, Michel de Certeau, and others, made resistance into a much wider and more ambiguous category than it used to be. Lila AbuLughod observes: ''What one finds now is a concern with unlikely forms of resistance, subversions rather than large-scale collective insurrection, small and local resistance not tied to the overthrow of systems or even to ideologies of emancipation' ' (1990: 41) . Abu-Lughod demonstrates that the use of lingerie and dreams of romantic love among young Bedouin women indeed is a form of resistance to patriarchal forms of domination, but that these practices also entail submission to other dominant ideologies, such as the privatization of the individual and the family and market-driven consumption (43 -55).
In the face of such obvious ambiguities of both resistance and power it seems that imposing a universal dialectic of power and resistance on diverse and complex situations may narrow rather than open the scope for interpretation. In his foreword to a new edition of Ranajit Guha's path-breaking Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, James Scott argues that Guha has avoided such a narrowing of perspective and has avoided reading the past in terms of the present: ''At every turn Elementary Aspects emphasizes the dangers of reading the process of insurgency with a political grammar based on mid-twentieth century nation-state political forms. In the place of formal organization . . . Guha finds informal networks . . . in the place of formal messages and public conflict, Guha finds the world of rumor'' (1999: xiii).
Both Guha's (1999) rich interpretation of a century of peasant insurgencies in colonial India read ''against the grain'' in official reports, and Scott's (1985, 1990 ) work on everyday forms of defiance, joking, and other kinds of ''lowintensity resistance'' have recorded a valuable range of acts of defiance, or passive insubordination, in local and emic terms far removed from the world of formal politics and organized opposition. The question is, Does the universal category of resistance or insurgency actually obtain in all these contexts? Do we not tend to inscribe a somewhat heroic dimension into actions that local actors may see as mundane, unexceptional, and maybe deeply ambivalent? Guha is aware of such ambiguities in acts of defiance, the blurring of lines between regular crime and collective resistance against authorities (1999: 77-108). Insurgence and resistance remain, nonetheless, the overall lens through which he interprets the British colonial reports on dacoitry, looting, killing of aristocrats-events that often were mediated through idioms of religion and community.
Our argument is that we need to be more sensitive to the historicity and polyvalent nature of the expressions, symbols, and acts we intuitively may register as resistance. The lives and acts of ordinary people may as well be intertwined with the lives of the powerful in the ''illicit cohabitation'' that Mbembe writes about, and revolts or resistance may well serve ends, reproduce structures of domination, or create new forms of power that are more repressive and violent than those preceding them. The works of Guha, Scott, and others have been crucial in wrestling the question of resistance and revolt out of the clutches of a powerful teleology that saw ''primitive'' revolts of peasants or marginal people as prepolitical stages of emancipation that could emerge fully as political/proletarian consciousness only in the modern (and Western) age. 6 Our argument, however, is that we should go one step further.
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As we try to make the state a less natural entity we should also endeavor to reverse the tendency toward reading resistance to the state into every mundane social act and instead listen to and record the discourses, the organization, and the context of that which from a distance appears as resistance. The result will inevitably be more perplexing and unclear but also more interesting, as Sherry Ortner (1995) argues in her critique of what she terms the ''ethnographic refusal'' to engage resistance empirically. Let us briefly mention two of the ambiguities involved in resistance and revolts against states: first, the logic of emulation of dominant orders by rebels and revolutionaries; second, the collapse of states and emergence of warlordism that has (re)appeared in the late twentieth century. As pointed out by Eric Wolf (1969) in his classic work on peasant wars in the twentieth century, these rebellions grew out of a complex and layered interaction between localized disgruntlement and the desire for upward mobility among ''middle peasants'' that was given a certain interpretation, direction, and shape by an educated, ideologically sophisticated leadership. The ordinary peasant had little idea of socialism or the catharsis of revolution but often desired a return to an idealized state of social equilibrium governed by proper moral conduct of patrons and officials, albeit in unequal relations (1969: 276 -303).
Guha points to how revolts inevitably take place within social imaginaries structured by prevailing arrangements of power and only rarely transgress established notions of authority but rather tend to reproduce these: ''Peasant kings were a characteristic product of rural revolt . . . and an anticipation of power was indexed on some occasions by the rebels designating themselves as a formally constituted army ( fauj), their commanders as law-enforcing personnel (e.g., daroga, subhadar, nazir, etc.)-all by way of simulating the functions of a state apparatus' ' (1999: 10) .
This logic of negative emulation and reproduction of structures of governance and, in effect, languages of stateness seem to be a recurrent feature of rebels and revolutionaries in many parts of the world: from the emperor crowned by rebellious slaves in Haiti in the late eighteenth century, to the peasant leader of the nineteenth-century Taiping revolution in China whose millenarian dreams of a new utopian state led him to regard himself as a new emperor, a new ''Son of Heaven,'' to countless local revolts that produced similar effects of negative emulation. Such effects were, of course, also highly productive in terms of giving idea, coherence, and structure to the parallel systems of governance, control, and sovereignty set up by rebels and revolu-tionaries. As the general ideas about what a state was, what it could do and should do expanded and diversified in nineteenth-century Europe, rebels and revolutionaries also developed ever more refined ideas about the utopian ''counterrepublics'' they desired to set up, with the Paris Commune in 1871 as a paradigmatic example.
Twentieth-century guerrilla warfare, famously theorized by Mao Ze-dong, set new standards for the sophistication of the ''parallel state'' organized by revolutionaries in liberated zones or as ''night governments'' in contested areas. These were state structures that used some existing structures of governance (taxation, territorial control, village councils, etc.) but also often aimed at introducing radically modern discourses, for example, of gender equality into marginal peasant communities by the use of ''state-of-the-art'' techniques of organization and surveillance, new procedures of justice, and more. In many cases, guerrilla movements inspired by Maoist doctrines became exceptionally effective builders of such parallel states by pursuing draconian reform of social structures, removal of competing centers of authority, such as religious institutions, and extension of control and political surveillance. During thirty years of guerrilla warfare the Eritrean People's Liberation Front created such a ''shadow state,'' partly organized around the kerbeles of the lineage society of the highlands and around the imperatives of war and production, but always controlled by the disciplined cadre structure of the movement. These structures became the backbone of the new independent state in 1993 (Iyob 1995).
Here, as among the Tamil Tigers in the Jaffna peninsula of Sri Lanka and the Sendero Luminoso in the Andean provinces in Peru, an all-pervasive logic of militarization, a strong ideology of personal sacrifice and the ennobling death in struggle, and devotion to what was believed to be an elevated leadership at the heart of the shadow state created organizations that were both effective and terrifying in their determination to control people, resources, and territory (Degregori 1991). Peasant populations in these areas came to realize that the governance practiced by these organizations often was harsher, more effective, and less negotiable than that of the old regime. In Peru, for instance, this harshness worked against the Senderistas, as did the imprisonment of Sendero Luminoso's mythical leader Guzman, the father and ''teacher'' of the new shadow state, in 1992.
If some of these militant movements almost suffocated their new subject populations in too much and too tight governance, the opposite seems to be introduction 35 true of some of the ''collapsed'' states in Africa. Here, warlords and strongmen have broken the territorial sovereignty of the state, throwing large territories into an almost Hobbesian predicament of apparently randomized but also ethnicized violence. Rather than shadow states, we are dealing here with shadow economies. The control of territories, people, and natural resources is not bureaucratized but relies on alliances, engagement in transnational economic networks, and coercion (Richards 1996; Bayart et al. 1998). Chilling practices of literally inscribing the sovereignty of the warlord into populations by maiming and disfiguration-as in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda-seem to be integral to these more mobile and floating sovereignties.
These ''commercial-military complexes,'' free from the weight of bureaucracies and creditor demands, are much more flexible than their developmentalist opponents, and throughout the 1990s several of the latter have mimicked the practices of the warlords (Duffield 2001). William Reno (1998) and Mark Duffield (1998, 2001 ) have argued that this kind of warlord society may be seen as an innovative system of political authority corresponding to the neoliberal world order, rather than as abnormal, and temporal, deviations from the governmentalized state.
This does not mean, however, that the languages and images of stateness evaporate. The weight of the international system of states and their allencompassing rituals of authorization reinforce the need for articulations and complicity between the warlord systems and state institutions. Furthermore, representatives of the nonbureaucratic warlord systems may justify their actions with reference to previous violation of their rights and their exclusion from state systems. As Monique Nuijten (1998) has illustrated in her study of land, domination, and politics in rural Mexico, state subjects do not necessarily give up claiming rights and entitlements just because the state representatives never fulfill their promises. In this sense, she argues, the state may best be understood as a ''hope-generating machine.''
The Great Enframer
The study of localized political struggles, of the functioning of local institutions of governance, of often disorderly and ambiguous forms of defiance or insubordination, of celebration of the myth of the state and its physical representations should caution us when it comes to drawing conclusions regarding the uniformity of how the current global languages of stateness are spoken, understood, and converted into policy and authority. If subjected to an ethnographic gaze, a strict Foucauldian view of modern governance as the inexorable global spread and proliferation of certain discursive rationalities and certain technologies tends to crumble. These forms of governmentality do exist and their techniques and rationales do circulate, but they only effect practical policies or administrative practices in a rather slow and often indirect way: sometimes as justifications for new measures or norms, sometimes simply as a form of ''scientific'' diagnosis, but always in competition with older practices and other rationalities.
We have pointed out in this introduction that the state, governance, and the effects and subjectivities shaped by the languages of stateness of our time need to be denaturalized and studied in rich ethnographic detail as an integrated part of the cultural economy of postcolonial societies. We have also pointed out that we cannot assume that an institution, a policy paper, a discursive construction, a protest, or the practices of a government official are ''the same'' all over the world. We have emphasized that the state is not a universal construction and that states have widely different histories, internal logics, and practices that need to be understood and studied. Yet there are many similarities, a real and effective circulation of a range of languages of stateness around the world, and very real and enduring mythologies of state. If the state as an actual social form is not universal, we may suggest that the desire of stateness has become a truly global and universal phenomenon.
In that light, we should perhaps regard the rhetoric of state officials, the nicely crafted white papers and policy documents, the ostensibly scientific forms of governance, the grand schemes and organizational efforts of governments, with all their paraphernalia of vehicles, titles, and little rituals, as parts of a continuous state spectacle asserting and affirming the authority of the state. These spectacles only occasionally succeed in producing the specific social effects they aim at, but always reproduce the imagination of the state as the great enframer of our lives. 2. For an incisive argument concerning the transformation of logics of state formation and governance from the late Spanish empire to the early national state in Central America, see
Rønsbo (1997).
3. The genealogy of one of the great fetishes of the modern mobile world, the passport, has recently been explored by John Torpey (2000). In fascinating detail Torpey explores how states introduction 37
